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Abstract
is paper argues that EU accession has brought about minimal changes in the pat-
terns of innovation in Hungary. e reason why is not that the ‘EU factor’ is of minor 
importance; rather, it is Hungary’s inability to use EU resources e#ectively, so as to fully 
bene$t from EU membership. e Hungarian story also demonstrates that the EU cannot 
block member states from reversing reform or abusing the opportunities EU membership 
o#ers to them. We contend that globalization (global value chain integration) has more 
e#ectively contributed to Hungary’s knowledge -based upgrading than Europeanization 
(in the sense of policy transfer; access to EU Structural & Cohesion Funds, and integra-
tion in the European Research Area). is argument is substantiated with a case study on 
innovation strategy design and implementation, which illustrates the ambiguous impact 
of Europeanization, which is contrasted with our investigation of integration in global 
value chains, conducted through interviews of foreign -owned manufacturing companies 
about their R&D-based upgrading experience.
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Introduction
In economies undergoing transformation, innovation stakeholders cherished high hopes 
for EU accession. Economic scholars have emphasized broad -based, so% factors, focusing on:
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adoption of EU best practices, e.g., concerning the governance of innovation; ∑
policy transfers and regular monitoring and evaluation of national innovation policies  ∑
by EU experts;
integration of innovative actors in European (cross -border) research undertakings – as  ∑
a solution to the fact that the resources of single nations are, in a growing number of 
research areas, below the critical mass needed to achieve breakthrough results;
collaboration with foreign centers of excellence and enhanced opportunities for  ∑
researchers’ mobility; and
access to resources of, and services o!ered by, an integrated European research infra- ∑
structure etc.
e expectations of local stakeholders are more closely aligned with, and restricted by, 
what may broadly be characterized as pecuniary considerations. Researchers concentrated 
upon funding instruments, such as the Research Framework and Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Programs, while innovative actors in the business or higher edu-
cation spheres (particularly innovation policy -makers) anticipated that a fair share of EU 
Structural and Cohesion Fund resources would be dedicated to innovation purposes.
Both sets of expectations have been met, and even exceeded. Local innovation under-
takings have bene"tted from an unprecedented volume of funding from Structural Funds, 
and the so# opportunities of EU-accession have also lived up to and, at time, gone beyond 
the expectations of stakeholders.
Methodological Di!culties of Quantifying the Impact
Quantifying the impact of EU accession (i.e., the quanti"cation of both inputs and out-
puts) presents huge methodological di$culties. In restricting our analysis to the pecuniary 
aspects, a preliminary question is how much EU funding Hungarian stakeholders could 
bene"t from. According to statistics published at the New Széchenyi Plan’s (Hungary’s 
development program) website, grants paid from EU Structural Funds that co-"nanced 
innovation activities in the 2010 to 2013 period was HUF 203.8 billion (€680 million). is 
amount is related to the ‘Science and Innovation Program’ of the New Széchenyi Plan.
Nevertheless, innovation and technology development related grants may also have been 
allocated to stakeholders through other Operational Programs, such as the ‘Development 
of Business Environment,’ ‘Green Economy Program,’ or Health Industry Programs.
Before 2010, regional innovative stakeholders could access support from Regional 
OPs. ese programs partially co-"nanced regional stakeholders’ R&D and technology 
development activities. Changes in OPs’ structure from 2010 onwards (OPs have become 
organized by policy priorities: they have not followed a territorial logic any more), cou-
pled with a lack of precise data, make it di$cult to accurately estimate the volume of 
innovation -related EU co-"nanced funding.
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Another estimation method is to apply the ‘share of the state budget in business enter-
prises’ R&D investments’ as a rough proxy. Data for this indicator are compiled by the Central 
Statistical O!ce. Given that EU Structural Funds have virtually substituted for national 
funds in Hungary (in terms of support provided to foster business enterprises’ R&D and 
technology development activities), this baseline proxy can adequately quantify this speci"c 
component of EU co-"nanced R&D-related investments. (Another important component of 
innovation -speci"c EU-funds supports higher education institutions’ research and research 
infrastructure development expenditures). According to Central Statistical O!ce data, the 
state budget accounted for ~4 % of business enterprises’ total R&D expenses in 2005 (when 
national funding was still available). In 2010 this indicator was ~14 %; in 2012: 15.7 %.
Quantifying innovation performance poses even greater methodological problems. 
Langford et al. [2006] distinguished R&D outputs from the outcomes of R&D undertakings, 
classifying, e.g., invention disclosures and patents into the "rst category and universities’ 
license revenues into the second category. Similarly, publications belong to the "rst cat-
egory and new scienti"c methods that result from those a given publication belong to the 
second. A third category that analysts have to deal with is the economic impact derived 
from R&D outputs: improved macroeconomic or environmental, societal etc. indicators. 
Spin-o# creation, for example, may be classi"ed as an outcome of R&D undertakings, 
while the number of employees and total revenues generated by spin-o# companies, as well 
as the value of university equity holdings in spin -o#s, belong to the third category. Simi-
larly, elaboration of a new process technology is an outcome of R&D, while cost savings, 
improved energy e!ciency, and productivity increases that result from the use of the new 
process technology belong to the economic impact category.
It also bears mention here that an analysis of the impact of EU accession on new 
member states’ innovation performance may be premature. One could argue that the 
2007–2013 period may be of inadequate length, since changes in a country’s innovation 
potential become manifest only over quite a long period.
Given these signi"cant methodological di!culties in measuring the impact of the 
EU on national innovation performance, this paper instead analyses how EU member-
ship is manifested in science, technology and innovation (STI) policy formulation and 
implementation, as well as in the characteristics of the national innovation system. Since 
the ‘Europeanization of STI policy’ is a complex and diversi"ed issue and encompasses 
multiple areas of public policy, we selected one speci"c "eld of Europeanization: the 
regionalization of innovation that ‘culminated’ in the dra$ing of regional research and 
innovation strategies for smart specialization.
We argue that EU accession has brought about minimal changes in the patterns of 
innovation in Hungary. Globalization (in the sense of global value chain integration) has 
more e#ectively contributed to Hungary’s knowledge -based upgrading than Europeaniza-
tion (in the sense of integration in the European Research Area; access to EU Structural 
& Cohesion Funds and adoption of EU-level innovation policy principles).
e reason for the relatively minor impact of EU-membership on Hungary’s knowledge-
-based upgrading is Hungary’s poor ability and, currently, lack of commitment, to use EU 
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resources e!ectively. ese de"ciencies in utilizing the opportunities of EU membership 
by using and leveraging EU resources to improve knowledge -based competitiveness is 
where the one half of the fault lies. e other half of the fault is the EU’s inability to block 
member states from reversing reform and blatantly abusing the opportunities of EU 
membership.
e rest of this paper is structured in "ve sections. e next section (section 2) brie#y 
summarizes the speci"cs of the Hungarian national innovation system (NIS), and frames 
our research question, which is whether EU-membership has provoked any changes in 
the features of the system. We compare the hard indicators used to measure the perform-
ance of the system with selected so$ features that may reveal more about system e%ciency 
improvements than the hard features.
is comparison is followed by a case study on the regionalization of innovation (sec-
tion 3), which is performed to illustrate our argument that the incorporation of European 
procedures and policy mechanisms in the Hungarian NIS (Europeanization) pertains to 
the realm of ‘dead letters’.
Section 5 substantiates a second "nding of this paper, which is that economic actors’ 
integration into global value chains exerted a strong in#uence on Hungary’s innovation 
performance and on Hungarian actors knowledge -based upgrading. We reach this "nding 
through interviews of "$een local, R&D-intensive subsidiaries of foreign manufactur-
ing multinational companies (MNCs). e interview sample and research method are 
described in section 4. Our conclusions, and resulting policy suggestions, are presented 
in section 6.
Characteristics of the Hungarian Innovation System
A popular Hungarian writer, György Moldova wrote a book about the Hungarian 
health system entitled ‘e spendthri$ beggar’. e title refers to the enormous waste of 
resources that characterizes the Hungarian health system; the convergence of overinvest-
ment in expensive medical instruments, hospital overcapacities, and shortages of basic 
resources (unpaid medicine suppliers, mediocre facilities, resource constraints for basic 
hospital maintenance etc.). Moldova’s witty metaphor equally applies to the Hungar-
ian NIS, which is also characterized by a low e%ciency of public investment in R&D and 
system -wide waste of resources.
As a matter of fact, the low e%ciency of public R&D investments applies (to a varying 
extent) to all new EU member states. Pop et al. [2014] surveyed the relationship between 
private and public R&D (intensity) and Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEE) 
growth performance, over the 1998 to 2008 period. According to the referred author’s 
calculations, the impact of public R&D is statistically insigni"cant in practically all the 
surveyed CEE economies. By contrast, private R&D (intensity increase) was found to have 
a signi"cant impact on growth.
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Hungary is one of the worst performers with respect to the e!ciency of public invest-
ments in innovation. Montalvo–Moghayer [2011] computed innovation system e!ciency 
indices; that is, input/output ratios of R&D e"orts. According to their calculations, Hungary 
had one of the least e!cient innovation systems, while the Czech Republic enjoyed the 
best performance among CEE economies.
Izsák et al. [2013] were concerned with the throughput of government support to busi-
ness innovation. $e authors analyzed the relation between the share of (1) government 
support to business innovation in total BERD and (2) SMEs introducing product or process 
innovation in 24 EU member countries and Switzerland. $ey found a broad, positive asso-
ciation between the two factors with a few exceptions. Hungary was one of those exceptions 
(together with Latvia and, to some extent, Bulgaria). Although a relatively large share of 
total funding was devoted to support business enterprise research, technology development, 
and innovation e"orts in these countries, the share of innovative SMEs was particularly low, 
re%ecting a thought -provoking mismatch between policy focus and outcome.
As outlined by Havas [2007; 2011], Hungary has successfully created the necessary 
institutions (government bodies, 'nancing, administrative and management agencies at 
various spatial levels; bridging organizations, NGOs etc.) that exist in developed economies 
with high -performing NISs. Hungary also employs a wide range of innovation support 
measures and policy schemes that target various components of the system at various stages 
of the innovation cycle. $e amount of support allocated to foster research, development 
and innovation activities, together with the volume of private innovation outlays, have 
considerably increased over the surveyed period – as quanti'ed by the hard indicators 
in table 1. Indeed, performance, as re%ected by the main input indicators and as shares 
of public, private and foreign sources of GERD, de'nitely started to converge to those of 
established EU economies (table 1).
TABLE 1.  Hungary’s national innovation system: evolution of some performance 
indicators since EU-accession
Source Indicator 2004 2012
a GERD/GDP 0.88 1.29
b SII 0.266 0.323
c Percentage of GERD financed by industry 37.1 46.9
c Percentage of GERD financed by government 51.8 36.9
a Total employment in R&D units 49,615 56,486
c Total researchers FTE 14,904 23,837
a Number of corporate R&D units 669 1,583
a Employment in corporate R&D units 8,870 23,298
S o u r c e s :  a) Central Statistical O!ce, Hungary; b) European Innovation Scoreboard, 2008 and Innovation Union Scoreboard, 
2013; c) OECD Science and Technology Indicators.
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Nevertheless, the real performance and e!ciency improvement of the Hungarian NIS 
is barely discernible using accepted indicators.1
For example, the value of the summary innovation index (SII) has de"nitely increased 
over the surveyed period.2 Composite indicators are, however, biased upwards by Hungary’s 
FDI-driven specialization in medium and high -technology industries. Consequently, the 
‘contribution of medium and high -tech product exports to the trade balance’ (an important 
component of composite indicators), is higher than average. e value of this indicator 
is driven by processing exporters with low and sometimes even declining(!) local value 
added shares.3
Statistical illusion with respect to the evolution of innovation performance is also 
reinforced by the increasing BERD-intensity of economic performance. is indicator is 
driven by the huge amount of support (co-"nanced from EU Structural Funds) allocated 
to R&D-speci"c investments. Access to R&D-speci"c support prompted companies to 
report R&D activities, which ampli"ed the improvement of this indicator, since under-
reporting and previously exerted a signi"cant downward bias on the number of companies 
with R&D activity [Sass, 2013].
e meagre performance of NIS is best re$ected by the fact that innovation per-
formance is still driven mainly by foreign companies.4 Indigenous companies’ technol-
ogy generation and, particularly, commercialization, is minimal, despite the clear focus 
of Hungary’s STI policy on downstream, i.e., direct business R&D [Izsák et al., 2013]. 
In 2010, 74 % of small enterprises (including foreign and domestic -owned ones) reported 
no innovation activity at all.
Public research institutions are still unable to convert their scienti"c results into 
commercial success, partly for lack of the necessary intangible capital and partly because 
of the underdeveloped market for technology.5 Public -private innovation collaboration 
is minimal and foreign subsidiaries rarely collaborate with indigenous companies in the 
"eld of R&D [Sass–Szalavetz, forthcoming] – as a matter of fact public -private collabora-
tion is more or less restricted to cases where speci"cally designated support is allocated 
to promote such collaborations.
An o+-mentioned feature of the Hungarian innovation system is that policy actors 
are weak and disorganized, and that coordination among them is minimal. Institutional 
stability is missing from the system; key institutions of innovation policy design and 
implementation have undergone radical reorganization in practically all political cycles 
[Gál, 2013]. Consequently, although strategic documents outlining the future orientation 
of STI policies are regularly prepared, written strategies usually remain dead letters.
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Case Study on the ‘Europeanization’ of the Hungarian 
Innovation System: ‘Façade Regionalism’
When discussing the impact of EU integration on the features of Hungary’s innovation 
system, it is necessary to distinguish between the ‘opportunity aspects’ of integration and 
the Europeanization of the system.
e opportunity aspect of EU integration derives from the possibility of emulating 
European best practices, which is facilitated by EU-funded institution building; institu-
tional capacity building; improvement of the framework conditions; strategy design; and 
implementation. ‘Opportunity’ is therefore closely related to local policy learning, fostered 
by technical advice, and supported by experimentation and feedback mechanisms. For 
example, as a member of the EU community Hungarian STI policy decision -makers bene"t 
from regular surveys of the innovation system carried out by EU experts [cf. European 
Commission, 2013]. ese surveys are intended to identify and mitigate structural impedi-
ments in member states’ innovation systems, and improve their e#ciency.
‘Opportunity’ is a so;er category than Europeanization: the latter implies an institu-
tionalization of rules, norms, policy mechanisms and procedures, and their incorporation 
into the national legislative and institutional systems – as a compulsory exercise and not 
as an opportunity for optional emulation, learning, and improvement.
If the potential of certain systemic changes is recognized, EU-level actions can be 
decided upon that will, in turn, be imposed on member states – for example, as an ex-ante 
conditionality for access to European Structural and Cohesion Funds.
A relevant example is the reform of the EU Cohesion policy that prescribed the prepa-
ration of research and innovation strategies for smart specialization (RIS3)6 as ex-ante 
conditionality for supporting R&D investments. is decision re%ects the recognition that 
di*erent regions face di*erent industrial and innovation policy challenges, depending on 
their endowments, industrial and technological specialization, distance to the technol-
ogy frontier, institutional development, collaboration intensity among actors, intra- and 
inter -regional linkages. Hence, this decision re%ects the fact that one size does not "t all 
[Reid, 2011].
As it will be shown, the implementation of RIS3 only appears to be an example of 
Europeanization: despite impeccable compliance, it actually exempli"es a missed ‘oppor-
tunity’ in Hungary. Drawing on the distinction made by Bachtler et al. [2013], rationalist 
adaptation occurred (i.e. formalistic adaptation, driven by actors’ opportunistic response 
to incentives) rather than sociological adaptation (driven by norms of appropriate behavior 
and identi"cation with the EU).
Developments were similar to what happened in the early 2000s, when the Europe-
anization of territorial governance (regionalization) was on Hungary’s agenda. Over time, 
several papers have convincingly demonstrated that despite ‘compliance on paper’ and 
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the creation of relevant territorial governance structures and institutions, the outcome 
of Hungary’s regionalization was increased centralization [Bruszt, 2008; Pálné Kovács, 
2009; 2013; Buzogány -Korkut, 2013]. ese referred works detail the speci#cs of the 
Hungarian ‘regionalization’, marked by ‘regionalism without regions’, i.e., weak regional 
structures with little legitimacy and powerless regional actors; vested interests of regional, 
local and national actors; double -speak; parallelisms (with counties, i.e., NUTS3 regions); 
and recurring centralization waves driven partly by the recognition of anomalies in the 
system but also by distrust between the national and the regional -level institutions and 
changing values, ideologies and norms.
e recent regionalization of the innovation system has followed a similar trajectory. 
National innovation policies started to take the regional/spatial dimension into account 
following the 2003. XC. Act on the Research and Technological Innovation Fund. e 
act prescribed that 25 % of the Fund’s yearly income be designated to regional innova-
tion purposes. Regional innovation agencies (RIAs) were founded in the mid-2000s and 
entrusted with designing regional innovation strategies, linkage building, and developing 
and providing regional innovation related services.
By the end of the 2000s, RIAs underwent substantial capacity development, accu-
mulating region -speci#c (or rather regional innovation system -speci#c) knowledge and 
relational capital. However, their institutional autonomy and capacity to in$uence regional 
innovation strategy implementation kept diminishing as a result of policy -makers’ repeated 
re-centralization moves.
e #rst milestone in the RIAs’ roll -back was a gradual hollowing out of the regionally 
decentralized innovation programs. While RIAs could initially in$uence the content of 
regionally decentralized innovation support programs and include regional speci#cs, that 
function was taken back (and made centrally) by the National Innovation O&ce (NIO).7 
According to an NIO o&cial’s comment to the author’s interview questions, decentraliza-
tion in the mid-2000s created a multitude of highly diversi#ed programs that were very 
di&cult to administer and monitor. erefore, the RIAs’ role was restricted to determining 
the range of strategic sectors receiving targeted support in the framework of the regionally 
decentralized programs. Otherwise, the support programs have become practically identi-
cal in all regions. “is made the process of regional innovation policy implementation 
more e&cient and easier to manage and administer.” (Interview with an NIO o&cial).
e next milestone in the process of suppressing the regional decentralization of inno-
vation was the government’s e*ort to channel regional applications away from regionally 
decentralized programs8 and towards centrally managed Operational Programs (OPs), 
by prescribing ever stricter conditions to gain support from the former program type. e 
national government gradually withdrew from funding regional innovation undertakings 
using regionally decentralized sources. e #nal calls for proposals under innovation sup-
port programs funded from regionally decentralized sources were in 2009. Subsequently, 
regionally earmarked grants from EU Structural Funds channeled through Operational 
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Programs have become the only region -speci"c source of funding innovation activities. 
Regional Operational Programs cannot, however, be considered regionally decentral-
ized sources of funding since program design, project selection, "nancial management, 
monitoring and evaluation are all under the central/national authority.
Parliamentary elections in 2010 brought about changes in the structure of OPs that 
further reversed the regionalization of innovation (and of development). Regional OPs 
were merged into the newly established functional OPs, such as the Science & Innovation, 
Green Economy, and Health Industry Programs.
As of 2010, RIAs received no more budgetary funding to cover the costs of their 
public bene"t activities (in the 2000s, their activity was funded from national sources). 
e traditional institutional instability that characterizes the Hungarian innovation and 
public administration systems was exacerbated following the parliamentary elections in 
that same year.
Responsibility for the allocation of funding from the Research and Technological 
Innovation Fund was then transferred from the National Innovation O#ce to the National 
Development Agency. e National Innovation O#ce was hollowed out and the majority 
of experts !red, in a manner similar to all other institutions of public administration and 
territorial development. Personnel changes involved not only the top management of the 
previous political cycle but also desk level o#cials. e implementation of innovation-
-related programs was frozen: new calls for proposals were not announced for more than 
a year. Existing contracts (signed during the period of the previous government) underwent 
a lengthy review process. Payment of contracted support was frozen or waived.
e National Development Agency became subordinated to a newly established min-
istry – the Ministry of National Development. Shortly therea$er, it was transferred under 
the authority of the Prime Minister’s O#ce (government decree 273/2013) and then six 
months later, dissolved (government decree 475/2013). Responsibility for the management 
and implementation of individual, innovation -related OPs was dispersed and transferred 
to various ministries: to the Prime Minister’s O#ce; the Ministry for National Economy; 
the Ministry of National Development; and the Ministry of Human Resources.
is fundamental restructuring of regional development culminated in the creation of 
the National Development Steering Committee (NDSC) to speed up the absorption of EU 
Structural Funds.9 NDSC has four members: Prime Minister (who plays the leading role), 
ministers for national development and the economy, and the state secretary in charge 
of the Prime Minister’s O#ce. Decisions on large -scale developmental projects and all 
innovation related programs (funded from Research and Technological Innovation Fund, 
or from OPs) rests with the NDSC (government decree 140/2012).
is lengthy (albeit far from comprehensive) enumeration of institutional and regula-
tory changes documents the mechanism that has brought about state capture in Hungary, 
where funding is based on political loyalty, rent -seeking and clientelism [cf. Ágh, 2013].10 
Key elements of this mechanism are the !ring of experts, over -politicization of public 
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administration, dissolution of existing institutions and creation of new ones; frequent 
redistribution of authorities and responsibilities leading to institutional chaos; and a paral-
lel centralization of power with respect to decisions that a!ect private gains. Paradoxical 
as it may seem, institutional instability and centralization have been going hand in hand, 
reinforcing each other in a ‘virtuous circle’.
e centralization of territorial development reached a tipping point just at the time 
of the o"cial reform of EU Cohesion Policy. A key component of the reform is the incor-
poration of smart specialization in national and regional innovation strategies.
is coincidence is important, since smart specialization is closely related to the con-
cept of partnership, empowerment of local stakeholders, decentralization and bottom-up 
approaches – given its strong reliance on local competitive strengths, the identi#cation of 
which requires the involvement of local stakeholders. Smart specialization necessitates 
mutual learning and experimentation, continuous interactions and evidence -based feed-
backs and adjustments.
It is therefore obvious that the concentration of power that characterizes Hungarian 
territorial development contradicts all elements of the smart specialization concept. e 
context of a ‘single -actor governance system’ notwithstanding, compliance on paper has 
been impeccable: all Hungarian RIAs prepared the RIS3 strategies of their regions within 
a timeframe of four to six weeks: they creatively re-worded the existing innovation strate-
gies along ‘new ideological lines’. e Ministry for National Economy synthesized these 
regional strategies and dra$ed a national -level smart specialization strategy designated to 
become part of the EU – Hungary Partnership Agreement for the programming period 
of 2014 – 2020.
While programming (strategy dra$ing) has been accomplished in full compliance with 
EU prescriptions, the claim that adaptation was formalistic and cynical is best substanti-
ated by the fact that strategy design and implementation (in terms of funding allocation) 
are worlds apart. Regional planning and programming have no in%uence on the content 
of innovation related policy instruments and support programs. ese latter are uniform 
across regions, which contradicts the concept of smart specialization. Even less commo-
nalities can be found between RIS3 strategies and the selection of support bene#ciaries.
In the context of a non-existing regional devolution of policy implementation and no 
regionally decentralized innovation support measures, RIS3 related activities such as plan-
ning, programming, social consultancy (involving local stakeholders in the programming 
process), – however exemplary – can be considered only a kind of façade regionalism, 
façade smart specialization.
Hence, in addition to the impact of EU integration, it seems necessary to analyze other 
factors that in%uence Hungarian innovation performance. e next sections explore the 
impact of Hungarian actors’ integration in global value chains (GVCs).
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Impact of FDI and GVC-Integration: Sample of Interviewed 
Companies
Hungary’s strong reliance on FDI-driven growth and modernization has made Hungary 
highly integrated in global value chains. According to De Backer and Miroudot [2012] who 
quanti!ed countries’ GVC-participation indices,11 the Czech Republic shows the high-
est GVC integration out of 33 OECD-economies (with an indicator slightly above 65 %). 
Slovakia and Hungary rank fourth and !"h, respectively, with values slightly below 65 % 
(p. 7).
Although Hungary has already lost its FDI attraction frontrunner status [Csáki, 
2001], FDI stock as a percentage of Hungary’s GDP is still among the highest in Europe 
(81.7 % in 2012, as compared to 69.6 % and 47.3 %, respectively, for the Czech Republic 
and Poland [ UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2013]. Following initial market -seeking 
investments in the 1990s, e$ciency -seeking FDI has become dominant [Sass -Kalotay, 
2012]. Relatively large FDI stocks characterize the electronics and transport equipment 
industries. Foreign -owned enterprises accounted for 66.2 % of total manufacturing value 
added in 2011. &eir share in total sales was above 95 % in the electronics and transport 
equipment industries and above 85 % in the machinery and electrical equipment indus-
tries (source: Central Statistical O$ce). &e prominent role of foreign -owned enterprises 
is also re*ected by their share in gross !xed capital formation; in 2011 it was 76.4 % in 
manufacturing [Central Statistical O$ce].
FDI-promotion policies gradually shi"ed their focus from quantity to quality -based 
considerations [Antalóczy et al., 2011]. Expectations towards foreign investors have turned 
increasingly sophisticated and variegated. Selective incentives have been applied to encour-
age existing investors to co-locate high value adding activities to their local production 
facilities, especially production -related R&D. Support programs also aimed at enhancing 
foreign investors’ local backward linkages, and local embeddedness has been promoted 
through policy measures fostering clustering and collaboration with local universities 
and public research organizations.
&e author of this paper interviewed 15 large manufacturing MNCs’ R&D-intensive 
Hungarian subsidiaries in the automotive and electronics industries; speci!cally, 9 automo-
tive and 6 electronics companies. &e share of foreign investors in total R&D expenditures 
is above the average in the two surveyed industries [Dachs et al., 2012].
Research was carried out between mid-2011 and 2013. Research questions addressed 
subsidiaries’ R&D-based upgrading experience and drivers of the upgrading process.12 
Interview questions are presented in the Annex of this paper.13
Given the qualitative nature of our research questions, we used a case study based 
investigation method [Yin, 2003], employing a semi -structured questionnaire containing 
open -ended questions. We interviewed either the CEOs or various functional managers 
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of the selected subsidiaries, including the chief procurement o!cer (two cases), the chief 
information o!cer (one case), the chief communication o!cer (two cases), the chief 
technology o!cer (two cases), and the manufacturing operations manager (one case). 
e interviews lasted 45 to 90 minutes (depending on the willingness of the interviewee 
to expound on details). As the interviewed "rms required anonymity, neither their names 
will be disclosed nor their main products speci"ed.
We selected large,14 100 % foreign -owned,15 export -oriented,16 R&D-intensive17 sub-
sidiaries. For each "rm, interview information was complemented with such documents 
as newspaper articles, "rm information brochures, and publicly available balance sheets, 
pro"t and loss statements, and o!cial ‘notes to the "nancial statement’.
Impact of GVC-integration on Hungarian Actors’ Knowledge-
-Based Upgrading –Interview Findings
We brie#y summarize the key "ndings of our interviews below. e purpose of doing 
so is not to provide a detailed account of the surveyed subsidiaries’ R&D-based upgrad-
ing. Interview "ndings are instead compiled here to substantiate our second theme, that 
GVC-integration is the key factor driving knowledge -based upgrading in Hungary.
e "rst important "nding of our investigation was that, over time, the product mix 
of virtually every surveyed companies underwent non-negligible changes; or rather, 
non-negligible development. Besides locating increasingly sophisticated products (that 
o$en required substantial tangible investment by the owners in new production equip-
ment, i.e., in technology development), local subsidiaries also co-evolved with their par-
ent companies. is was particularly pronounced when local "rms had responsibility for 
producing their MNC-owners’ newly developed products. Each new product launch18 
involved local process development activities, while gaining a new product mandate (which 
was subject to inter -subsidiary competition) required local engineers’ production planning 
(plant layout planning) e*orts and their development of technological solutions.
We found that over time, local production related support R&D activities were invari-
ably co-located to the surveyed MNCs’ manufacturing facilities, as production ‘pulled’ 
development activities. Initially, R&D activities were con"ned to routine problem -solving 
and testing tasks. Eventually, however, more skill -intensive, higher value -added process 
development activities were entrusted to the subsidiaries that managed to convince their 
owners about their capabilities.
It became evident that among o*shored business functions, R&D o*ers the long-
est upgrading trajectory for catching-up peripheral subsidiaries. e ‘quality ladder’ of 
R&D activities is quite long, since R&D functions can be decomposed into a multitude 
of activities that feature di*erent skill intensities and value adding capabilities [Schmitz-
-Strambach, 2009].
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Upgrading within the R&D function may proceed along the extensive margin, with the 
take-up of additional tasks, and/or along the intensive margin, which refers to the increas-
ing complexity of the R&D tasks with which local subsidiaries are entrusted. Moreover, 
R&D activities may evolve in scope if high -performing local subsidiaries are entrusted 
with R&D tasks that support the subsidiary’s local production function and perform 
R&D activities that add value to partner subsidiaries and/or headquarters (MNC-level 
R&D-activities). Upgrading within the R&D function may culminate in world product 
mandates (when a subsidiary gains responsibility for all development activities related to 
a speci!c product in the MNC’s portfolio).
Although there were several companies in our sample (4 out of 15) that were stuck 
in relatively low-level R&D activities, most of them managed to enhance the complexity 
of the R&D activities (though a sample selection bias may apply).19 Subsidiaries gained 
additional tasks in process, in product, tool, and process- or product -related so"ware 
development, as well as testing, product adaptation, and design.
In addition to the co-location rationale (according to which problems should be 
solved ‘at source’, as they arise [Lanz et al., 2011]) investors considered the wage di#er-
ences between home and host country scientists and engineers an important factor that 
motivated their R&D internationalization decision.
$e interviewed subsidiaries were quite successful in accessing public support 
(co-!nanced from EU Structural Funds) that had been earmarked for R&D activities. 
However, the interviewed managers were unanimous in claiming that public support did 
not prompt owners to carry out R&D activities at their local subsidiaries (or extend and 
deepen existing R&D activities); rather, such support was a catalyst that accelerated the 
owners’ earlier decision to upgrade local subsidiaries and co-locate some R&D activities 
to the premises of production. $is view was at least partially corroborated by the fact that 
support applications were submitted a"er a systematic evaluation of costs and promised 
bene!ts of investment into local R&D activities, and only in cases when these evaluation 
exercises yielded positive results.
Lessons and Conclusions
In this paper we argue that EU membership has not provoked cogent transformations 
in the features and e%ciency of the Hungarian national innovation system. Economic 
actors’ integration into global value chains has more e#ectively contributed to knowledge-
-based upgrading, though the allocation of funding from Structural Funds to multinational 
companies’ local subsidiaries seems to have e#ectively accelerated this latter process.
It must be acknowledged that our approach has limitations, such as the relatively short 
survey period (insofar as changes in a country’s innovation system take a long time to 
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become manifest in improved performance), and the small number of !rms interviewed 
(a 15- !rm -sample does not allow for general conclusions).
Another limitation is the subjective character of our assessment, given that the Hun-
garian experience is analyzed in isolation. It is fair to suppose that other new member 
states have not shown signi!cantly better NIS-evolution dynamics following EU accession. 
It is up to future research to compare the e"ciency of other new member states’ national 
innovation systems.
ese limitations notwithstanding, important ‘telling’ indicators have not changed, 
including: (1) the enduring dominance of foreign companies in gross #xed capital forma-
tion in manufacturing; (2) the high share of foreign companies in total private R&D outlays 
(see footnote 4); and (3) the low e"ciency of public funds in generating innovation -driven 
growth, together with the prevalence of local subsidiaries’ co-evolution with their mother 
companies in terms of functional upgrading and taking up R&D activities. It therefore 
seems self -evident that the major channel of improving innovation performance is through 
MNCs’ relevant activities.
Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that R&D activities carried out within MNCs’ 
organizations will per denitionem forestall commercialization -related problems. e 
results of subsidiaries’ R&D activities will be used by the MNC-owners, or a market for 
subsidiaries’ innovation results will be ensured by the MNC-owners.
Although it is relatively easy to pick individual success stories with respect to foreign 
investment in R&D, and local manufacturing subsidiaries’ R&D-based upgrading, exces-
sive reliance on foreign investors has real drawbacks. Since the volume and the quality of 
domestic R&D capital stock are highly important determinants of foreign R&D investment 
[see, e.g., Erken and Kleijn’s econometric exercise, 2010, and a literature survey by Ambos 
and Ambos, 2011] the poor overall innovation performance of Hungarian indigenous 
!rms cannot be countered by individual success stories of MNC subsidiaries’ R&D-based 
upgrading. A near -exclusive reliance on foreign investment with respect to BERD greatly 
reduces the multiplier e#ect of foreign investments into R&D. Furthermore, sporadic 
individual success stories of R&D-based upgrading usually remain below the critical mass, 
failing to push speci!c industries or regions to a knowledge -based growth trajectory.
Recently, however, the indicator ‘number of indigenous innovative companies’ started 
to increase and the ‘share of companies with no innovative activities’ diminished.20 ese 
are clear-cut positive e#ects of EU membership. But these indicators have not necessar-
ily improved as a result of indigenous companies’ capacity building: their upswing may 
be simply a statistical illusion, explained by the fact that a large number of companies 
have received support from EU Structural Funds earmarked for R&D activities. In con-
sequence, recipient companies report that they carry out innovative activities. Note 
that the boundaries between ‘no innovative activities’ and ‘some kind of innovation’ are 
quite elusive, and depend on the discretionary assessment of the managers that !ll the 
CIS-questionnaires.21
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Consequently, the absorption of EU Structural Funds that target innovation does not 
necessarily lead to improved, innovation -based economic performance: more innovative 
activities will be performed, but their economic impact remains to be seen.
Notes
1 According to the classification of the Innovation Union Scoreboard [2014], Hungary’s position is 
of a ‘moderate innovator,’ though three of its seven regions are modest innovators.
2 Hungary’s SII has been steadily growing since the mid-2000s (up to 0.351 in 2013) but it is still far 
below the EU-average of 0.554 (Source: Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014, p. 92). According to Csuka–
Török [2014], Hungary’s innovation performance is broadly in line with its development level. Over the 
past decade its position within the EU (measured by SII rankings) has not significantly worsened, which 
is in marked contrast to Hungary’s substantially deteriorating comparative economic performance. See 
also Török [2008] about rankings and the relation between science, innovation and macroeconomic 
performance.
3 According to Pitti’s [forthcoming] calculations from data of the National Tax Authority, the ratio 
of value added to gross output in the Hungarian electrical and optical equipment industry was a mere 
12.7 % in 2012 (11% in 2007); in the transport equipment industry, 19.9 % in 2012 (18.6 % in 2007 and 
22.7 % in 2010).
4 According to Pitti’s [2010] calculations from the data of the National Tax Authority, in the second 
half of the 2000s, the share of foreign investors in total business enterprises financed R&D outlays was 
between 85 and 90 %. According to CSO-data, in 2012 50.9 % of total researchers working in corporate 
R&D departments worked in foreign -owned companies. There is a marked discrepancy between CSO and 
Tax Authority data with respect to the share of foreign owned companies within total business enterprise 
financed R&D outlays; according to Tax Authority data, foreign investors’ share is by ~ 25–30 % higher, 
amounting to 85 or 90 % of the total.
5 Edler [2011], compared the development level of demand conditions for innovation in CEE 
countries based on the World Economic Forum’s large -scale survey of business leaders’ subjective assess-
ments. He found that buyer sophistication (inclination and ability of buyers to select products based on 
performance rather than price and, thus, their willingness to purchase innovative products) is the lowest 
in Hungary. According to business leaders’ perceptions, the impact of public procurement on innovation 
and technology generation is the smallest, and practically non-existent, in Hungary. Corruption, bribery, 
and government favoritism in public purchasing decisions is high. Note that Edler analysed the 2008–2009 
edition of the World Competitiveness Report; since then the situation has significantly deteriorated in 
Hungary. One example, by way of illustration, concerns buyer sophistication. From placing 95th out of 
134 countries in 2008–2009, Hungary slid to the 125th place by 2013–2014 out of 148 countries (the Czech 
Republic is 75th, Poland is 93rd).
6 For details see the RIS3 Guide issued by the European Commission (http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.
eu/ s3pguide). See also: Foray et al., 2009; 2011;
7 Up till 2011, the name of the Office was National Office for Research and Technology.
8 Initially, regionally decentralized programs were more popular than EU co-financed, centrally 
announced operational programs targeting innovation, mainly because the former programs required 
relatively little co-financing by recipients and advance payments were available. By contrast, the required 
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level of beneficiary co-financing in the case of operational programs is often above 50 %. Moreover, region-
ally decentralized programs were much simpler to administer, whereas OP-support imposed a substantial 
administrative burden on beneficiaries.
9 According to the data of the Regional Innovation Scoreboard [2014],Hungary was found to have 
the lowest absorption rates (p. 30), which is explained by institutional instability and frozen / waived 
programs.
10 Note that in contrast to the distinction applied by Innes (2014), who distinguished between ‘party 
state capture’ (aiming to monopolize political power) and ‘corporate state capture’ (exercised mainly for 
private gains), Hungary represents a combination of these two ideal types.
11 Going beyond the simple import content (or rather foreign value added content) of exports, the 
GVC Participation Index contains foreign value -added and domestic value -added used in third country 
exports (as a share of gross exports in percentages). Thereby, it captures the downstream side of integration, 
i.e., the value of inputs exported to third countries that will, in turn, be used in these countries’ exports.
12 Research was funded by the Hungarian National Research Fund [OTKA K83982]. Some interviews 
were carried out in collaboration with Magdolna Sass, who also received financial support from EU FP7 
“Growth -Innovation -Competitiveness: Fostering Cohesion in Central and Eastern Europe” [ GRINCOH]. 
Section 5 of the paper draws partly on Sass–Szalavetz [forthcoming]; and on Szalavetz [2013].
13 The findings presented in this paper are the outcome of two large -scale research undertakings, 
each of which addressed a number of topics that influenced the surveyed firms’ upgrading experience and 
performance. The list of interview questions in the Annex contains only the questions that are relevant 
for this paper’s focus.
14 In 2012, the average number of employees at the surveyed firms was 1,321 and average sales were 
EUR 186.6 million. The sample was selected from the authors’ database of case studies and journal articles 
on the activities of Hungarian subsidiaries in the chosen sectors. This sample selection method poses the 
risks of selection bias: our sample consists of well -known ‘blue chip’ companies that may show above-
-average upgrading performance.
15 The sample included subsidiaries of German, French, Danish, American, Mexican and Japanese 
MNCs.
16 The average share of exports in total sales was 87.7 % in 2012.
17 The average number of R&D staff was 23 (2012). Most of the interviewed companies refrained 
from disclosing the share of R&D outlays in total sales.
18 According to the terminology used by innovation economics scholars, new product launch refers 
to products that are new to the local subsidiary, while new a product mandate refers to new to the world 
(new at MNC-level) products.
19 When inquiring about the evolution of the ‘depth’ (complexity) of R&D tasks, we applied measure-
ment constructs advanced by Taggart [1998], measuring the quality and the complexity of R&D activi-
ties with their average timeframe, i.e., with the time that elapses until the given research undertaking is 
expected to bear fruit. Routine, problem solving R&D tasks have a timeframe of a several hours or days. 
The timeframe of engineering support tasks (including applied engineering for the launch of new products, 
quality management, process optimization, minor product improvements etc.) ranges from several weeks 
to several months. The more advanced an R&D task is (e.g., software development, design, new product 
development) the longer time is allocated for the project before the first results can be expected.
20 Data will be available only within one or two years, since this indicator is quantified by bi-annual 
CIS-surveys.
21 Considering the broad conceptualization of innovation it is fair to report innovative activities even 
in cases when innovation is confined to investment in new machinery, the installation of which requires 
process development, adaptation etc. Hence, purchases of new production technology (the action that was 
supported by EU Structural Funds) represent process innovation. As for product innovations, Inzelt and 
Szerb’s [2006], finding that in lagging regions this kind of innovation usually denotes minor changes in the 
product parameters that do not improve the given firm’s export potential still applies – a decade later.
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Appendix
Interview report
Note: "is Appendix contains only some of the questions asked in the framework of 
two large -scale research undertakings: only the questions relevant for this paper’s focus 
are listed below.
1. Basic company data
t /BNFBOEBEESFTT	DJUZPOMZ

t .BJOQSPEVDUT
t 0XOFSTIJQ
t 4BMFT
t 4IBSFPGFYQPSUTJOUPUBMTBMFT
t &NQMPZNFOU
t /VNCFSPG3%TUBČ
t 	"QQSPYJNBUF
TIBSFPG3%PVUMBZTJOUPUBMTBMFT
2. Activity and evolution of activity portfolio
t 8IBUJTUIFDPSFBDUJWJUZPGUIFDPNQBOZ 
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t )BTUIFLOPXMFEHFUFDIOPMPHZBOETLJMMJOUFOTJUZPGUIFDPSFBDUJWJUZJODSFBTFE
since the establishment of the Hungarian subsidiary?
t )BTUIFQSPEVDUNJYDIBOHFEFWPMWFEPWFSUJNF 
t %JEUIFBCPWFNFOUJPOFEDIBOHFTSFRVJSFBOZUBOHJCMFJOWFTUNFOU	QVSDIBTFPS
relocation of new machinery) and any speci!c training from the part of both the 
blue and white -collar sta"? Please explain the speci!cs of the learning process!
t *TUIFDPNQBOZFOHBHFEJOBOZQSPEVDUJPOTQFDJĕDTVQQPSUBDUJWJUJFT 1MFBTFMJTU
them and explain how the (support) activity portfolio of the company evolved!
3. R&D activities
t 1MFBTFQSPWJEFTPNFEFUBJMTBCPVUUIFTQFDJĕDTBOEUIFFWPMVUJPOPG3%BDUJWJ-
ties!
t &YQMBJOIPXUIFMPDBMNBOBHFNFOUDPOWJODFEUIFQBSFOUDPNQBOZTNBOBHFNFOU
to locate R&D activities to Hungary! What do you think the owners’ motivations 
were in this respect?
t $PVMEUIFMPDBMTVCTJEJBSZCFOFĕUGSPNBOZHPWFSONFOUTVQQPSUXJUISFTQFDUUP
R&D and/or investments in new technology? Did you apply for support?
t 8IBUJTZPVSPQJOJPOBCPVUOBUJPOBMSFHJPOBMCVTJOFTTJOOPWBUJPOQSPNPUJPO
opportunities in Hungary?
4. R&D-speci!c linkages, innovation collaboration
t %PZPVDPMMBCPSBUFXJUIBOZMPDBMSFHJPOBMPSOBUJPOBMIJHIFSFEVDBUJPOJOTUJUV-
tions and/or research organizations? Please provide some details about the speci!cs 
of this collaboration!
t "SFZPVNFNCFSPGBDMVTUFS 8IBUXBTUIFNBJONPUJWFPGZPVSDMVTUFSNFNCFS-
ship? What are the key bene!ts of your cluster membership?
t %PZPVPVUTPVSDFBOZ3%TQFDJĕDBDUJWJUZUP)VOHBSJBOBDUPST 
